CASE ANALYSIS -Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr.(2025 INSC 909) By Advocate Avichal Pandey, Allahabad High Court

CASE ANALYSIS -Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr.

(2025 INSC 909)

By Advocate Avichal Pandey, Allahabad High Court

Court & Bench

Supreme Court of India

Coram: -

●Hon’ble Justice M.M. Sundresh and

●Hon’ble Justice N. Kotiswar Singh

Factual Matrix

The instant matter arose out of an interlocutory application preferred by the State of Haryana seeking modification of the Supreme Court’s earlier directions mandating that notices under Section 41-A CrPC (now Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023) must be served strictly in accordance with the statutory modes prescribed, and not through electronic means such as WhatsApp.

The applicant-State contended that with the advent of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), legislative intent had evolved to permit service through electronic communication, thereby justifying modification of the earlier order.

Core Legal Issue

Whether notice issued under Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023 (analogous to Section 41-A CrPC) can be validly served through electronic modes such as WhatsApp or other digital platforms?

Submissions

●On behalf of the Applicant-State

●Electronic service enhances efficiency and prevents evasion.

●Sections 64 and 71 BNSS permit electronic service of summons.

●Section 530 BNSS reflects legislative intent to incorporate technology.

●Distinction between CrPC and BNSS justifies revisiting earlier directions. 

On behalf of the Amicus Curiae

●Section 35 notice is not akin to court-issued summons.

●Electronic service is not contemplated under Chapter VI BNSS.

●Liberty implications necessitate strict compliance with prescribed modes.

●Investigative stage is consciously excluded from electronic procedures. 

Judicial Reasoning

1. Nature of Section 35 BNSS – A Substantive Safeguard

The Court emphasized that Section 35 is not merely procedural but embodies a substantive protection against arbitrary arrest, directly linked to Article 21 of the Constitution. Non-compliance with such notice may result in arrest, thereby affecting personal liberty. 

2. Legislative Intent and Expressio Unius Principle

The BNSS explicitly permits electronic communication in specific contexts (e.g., Sections 63, 64, 71, 94, 193, 530). The deliberate omission of Section 35 from this framework indicates a conscious legislative exclusion. 

3. Distinction Between Investigation and Judicial Proceedings

The Court drew a clear demarcation:-

Summons → Judicial act (Court-driven, lesser liberty implications)

Notice under Section 35 → Executive act (Police-driven, direct liberty impact)

Thus, procedural flexibility available in judicial processes cannot be imported into investigative actions. 

4. Liberty-Centric Interpretation

Given that non-compliance may culminate in arrest, the Court held that service must be strict, formal, and verifiable, excluding informal electronic modes which may lack authenticity and reliability.

5. Limited Scope of Section 530 BNSS

Section 530 applies to “trials, inquiries, and proceedings” and consciously excludes investigation, thereby negating the argument for electronic service during investigation stage. 

Ratio Decidendi

Service of notice under Section 35 of the BNSS, 2023 cannot be effected through electronic communication such as WhatsApp, as the statute does not recognize such a mode, and any deviation would undermine the legislative intent and the constitutional safeguard of personal liberty under Article 21.

Decision

The Supreme Court dismissed the application for modification and reaffirmed its earlier directions mandating strict compliance with statutory modes of service. 

Critical Analysis

This judgment reinforces a liberty-oriented interpretative approach, prioritizing procedural sanctity over administrative convenience. The Court has consciously resisted the expansion of digital mechanisms into domains where civil liberties are directly at stake.

While the BNSS signals a progressive shift towards digitization, the Court rightly underscores that such transformation cannot be indiscriminate. The ruling ensures that technological efficiency does not dilute due process guarantees.

However, the judgment may invite debate on whether rigid insistence on physical service could, in certain cases, hinder effective investigation. A balanced legislative intervention may be warranted to introduce secure, verifiable electronic modes with adequate safeguards.

Conclusion

The decision stands as a significant reaffirmation of procedural safeguards in criminal law, delineating clear boundaries for the use of technology in investigation. It cements the principle that where liberty is at stake, procedural rigor cannot be compromised, thereby strengthening the constitutional ethos of fair investigation.

Advocate Avichal Pandey is a practicing counsel before the Allahabad High Court and a legal expert in Constitutional, Criminal, Service, and Matrimonial Matters.